



2

**Reinventing the Wheel:
Structuring Aerospace Forces for
Foreign Internal Defense**

**A Monograph
by
Major Richard D. Newton
United States Air Force**



**DTIC
ELECTE
APR 19 1991
S B D**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 90-91

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 18/01/91		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Aerospace Forces for Foreign Internal Defense				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Richard D. Newton, Major, USAF					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Attn: ATZL-SWV Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 (913) 684-3345 AVN 552-3345				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) [REDACTED]					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Internal Defense, Air Commando, Security Assistance, Low Intensity Conflict, Special Air Warfare				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 50	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited		

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


MONOGRAPH APPROVAL


Major Richard D. Newton

Title of Monograph: Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring
Aerospace Forces for Foreign Internal
Defense

Approved by:


_____, Monograph Director
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Mitchell


_____, Director, School of
Colonel Gordon F. Atcheson Advanced Military
Studies


_____, Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

Accepted this 28th day of January 1991

ABSTRACT

REINVENTING THE WHEEL: STRUCTURING AEROSPACE FORCES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE. by Major Richard D. Newton, USAF, 49 pages.

Effective United States military support of counterinsurgency efforts in developing nations almost always takes the form of indirect support--training, advisory assistance, logistics support, and supply of essential military equipment. The aggregate of actions taken to help a government resist a revolutionary insurgency is called foreign internal defense. The theme of this monograph is the lack of organized capability in the US Air Force to conduct foreign internal defense (FID), specifically training and advisory assistance, in support of national policy.

During the 1960s, the USAF Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) possessed the capability to train friendly foreign governments how to effectively employ air power in a counterinsurgency environment. That capability was lost when the SAWC was deactivated in 1974 in the wake of Vietnam. The thesis of this paper is that the need for such an organization still exists and offers a proposal to restore the capability in the US Air Force.

The monograph begins with a short history of US Air Force efforts to support foreign internal defense. It then presents an overview of the insurgency/counterinsurgency environment, consistent with the discussion in JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Next, based upon the requirements set by national policy and Service doctrine, the paper analyzes the sort of USAF organization needed to integrate air assets and conduct the tactical missions of FID. The paper concludes by proposing a wing structure dedicated to foreign internal defense.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution	
Availability	
Restrictions	
Dist	
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Background	8
III. The Insurgency Environment	15
IV. Analysis	23
V. Conclusion and Recommendation	30
ENDNOTES	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY	46

INTRODUCTION

The military challenge to freedom includes the threat of war in various forms, and actual combat in many cases. We and our allies can meet the thermonuclear threat. It remains for us to add still another military dimension: the ability to combat the threat known as guerrilla warfare.

John F. Kennedy¹

The 1988 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that in most instances of security assistance, "the most appropriate application of US military power is usually indirect, . . . training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment."² Experience has shown that in a counterinsurgency situation, it is a grave political error to exercise the full weight of US military power. Indirect support will therefore be the "most common role in which US forces will conduct counterinsurgency."³ This has been a tenet of national policy since first proposed by President Richard Nixon in his 1969 State of the Union Address.

In the past 20 years, most instances of US military involvement have been to train or assist host nation forces and civilian agencies. Since the end of Vietnam, US leaders have been reluctant to place military forces into direct

combat situations. In fact, President Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, went so far as to propose strict prerequisites for committing the US military to combat.⁴ These policies have caused the military to seek noncombat ways of assisting friendly foreign governments.

The Air Force, like the other Services, must be able to "assist allied air forces organize, train, and equip their forces" to provide for their own security.⁵ While quite capable of conducting quality training with the air forces of developed nations, the Air Force has had no organized capability to assist allied forces combatting an insurgency since 1974. By and large, the methods, techniques, and procedures unique to counterinsurgency (COIN) aerial warfare have been forgotten in today's US Air Force.⁶

The ability to advise or train friendly foreign governments to effectively employ air power in counterinsurgency situations has been a capability sorely missed in the Air Force of the past 15 years.⁷ Using the conceptual framework first proposed by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Dean, this monograph will examine how the Air Force might restore that capability. Colonel Dean's work is widely recognized throughout the Air Force as valid and reliable.⁸ In his book, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict, Colonel Dean suggested that there were three levels of participation for the military in Third World-related counterinsurgency. Those three levels are assistance (training and equipment sales), integration

(advising, joint exercises, and non-combat participation), and intervention (unilateral direct action).⁹ Colonel Dean goes on to say that Foreign Internal Defense (FID) "is the heart of the assistance level" of US military participation.¹⁰ More recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that foreign internal defense (along with security assistance) is the most relevant tool for low-intensity conflict.¹¹ To achieve an effective Air Force role in FID, this paper proposes an organization structured to assist others conducting COIN aerial operations.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is defined as those civil and military actions taken by agencies of the US government to assist a host government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.¹² US military forces conduct security assistance and development programs to help a nation develop and sustain the ability to protect itself. Military training programs are subordinate to and complement the economic, social, educational, and political elements of the counterinsurgency strategy.

The challenge of counterinsurgent warfare in developing nations has the potential of becoming a significant threat to the vital interests of the United States. The problem, though, is that the weapon systems, organizations, and philosophy required for COIN are different from conventional warfare. Although the Defense Guidance requires the Air Force to prepare forces for combat across the entire

spectrum of conflict, focusing almost exclusively on high technology and conventional war against the Soviet Union has eliminated its ability to address insurgent threats.¹³

Inability to respond to insurgent situations means that the USAF is less able to help its allies and friends defeat their insurgent guerrillas. The Air Force suffers a credibility problem when invited to assist developing nations--what we espouse is not what we practice. Because USAF doctrine, tactics, and weapon systems are focused on the Soviet Union, they have little utility in developing nations facing internal revolution. Granted, the US Air Force has an impressive capability to fight and win at the upper end of the conflict spectrum. What it lacks, though, is an organic capability to conduct, and thus influence through training, advice, and assistance that form of conflict most likely to be found in the developing regions of the world--guerrilla warfare.¹⁴

According to General John R. Galvin, former Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command, "We are not sending soldiers to these countries, we are sending developers and instructors The essential problem here isn't military, and the answer to the problem isn't military."¹⁵ General Galvin's statement recognizes that the problem goes beyond combat operations. Military forces assisting a friendly foreign nation must also develop the economic, administrative, and social systems in the supported country. Recently, the United States Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) renewed its interests in those aspects of Foreign Internal Defense other than combat skills.¹⁶

As the only unified command with the "specific, principle mission of FID," USSOCOM recognizes that the military must enhance and complement the other elements of an overall government internal defense and development plan.¹⁷ A key principle guiding US actions in COIN is that host governments bear the primary responsibility for their own development and security.¹⁸ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney recently noted that US military forces must not usurp the role of host country forces and agencies. He also stated that efforts to solve the problems could be "successful only if the host countries aggressively address the problems in their own societies. . . ."¹⁹

This monograph will examine the tactical aspects of Foreign Internal Defense, namely the training requirements necessary for air forces in developing nations. The scope of the monograph precludes a discussion of the direct combat role of US forces in COIN. Also, the strategic implications of FID are left for further study. A basic assumption of the study is that the USAF must be able to address those situations requiring less technological sophistication than would a European, Southwest Asian, or other conventional scenario. This assumption leads us into the criterion.

Each country and its insurgency are different from any other. Any proposed Air Force organization dedicated to FID must be able to adapt its methods and tactics to accommodate

dynamic economic, political, and military conditions, as well as changing rules of engagement.²⁰ This requirement for adaptability is the criterion against which a proposed FID organization is judged. In other words, the measure of success for this study is the proposed unit's ability to effectively meet the training needs of the many different nations likely to request US assistance.

JCS Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, reinforce this standard of criteria by making adaptability one of the imperatives for low-intensity conflict. These manuals state that adaptability means much more than simply tailoring flexible organizations.²¹ It also includes developing and fielding new ones appropriate to each situation. Therefore, what the Air Force must have is an organization able to examine an insurgency, build an effective security assistance and internal development plan, and then institute an effective training program for the supported nation's aviation resources.²²

I will use the following methodology to present and evaluate the research. The paper begins by discussing the history of US Air Force efforts to support foreign internal defense. Secondly, it presents a brief overview of the counterinsurgency environment, including a discussion of USAF tactical missions in COIN. Next, based upon the requirements set by national policy and military doctrine, I

will discuss the characteristics of the USAF organization needed to effectively integrate air assets and conduct foreign internal defense and development. Finally, the concluding section recommends an Air Force organizational structure to perform the security assistance aspects of Foreign Internal Defense programs.

This proposal is not made in a vacuum. The Air Force once had the capability to assist developing nations apply air power effectively to combat insurgency. By looking at its own history, from as recently as the early 1970s, perhaps the Air Force can gain some valuable insights that will enable it to perform Foreign Internal Defense in the less developed nations requesting US assistance once again.

BACKGROUND

In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy asked the Department of Defense to examine ways of developing a capability to respond to Communist-sponsored subversion in underdeveloped countries. The President was concerned about Nikita Krushchev's announcement of Soviet support for "wars of national liberation" and the realization that the United States had no forces capable of responding to military challenges below the level necessary to trigger nuclear war.²³ Nuclear equality had limited the superpowers to "small wars" rather than direct confrontation.

At the time, however, none of the US military services had units specifically designed to combat insurgency or revolutionary warfare. The Services' force structure was built with the belief that current conventional forces were adequate to handle any non-nuclear eventuality.²⁴ The Army's three Special Forces (SF) Groups were trained to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in support of theater commanders' war plans. The Air Force gave selected tactical airlift units the secondary mission of supporting the Army UW forces. None of these units, though, were dedicated to assisting foreign governments combatting an insurgency. To address the President's concern, the Air Force created the 4400 Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), nicknamed "Jungle

Jim," with the double mission of training and combat. Activated in April 1961, the squadron developed the capability to conduct counterinsurgency aerial warfare in the US Air Force. Its orientation towards strike operations, airlift, and reconnaissance, reflected the lessons learned from past unconventional excursions. The Jungle Jims trained selected USAF personnel to operate and maintain vintage aircraft and equipment, prepared those aircraft for transfer to friendly foreign governments, provided advanced training to host nation personnel, and developed improved weapons, munitions, tactics, and employment techniques.²⁵ In addition, by providing small training cadres to host nations, the 4400 CCTS was supposed to help allies create the conditions under which their insurgencies could be controlled and eliminated.

The 4400 CCTS's aircraft were not the most sophisticated nor the most capable in the USAF inventory. Quite the opposite, the squadron used older, simpler aircraft possessing the special characteristics needed by the developing nations they would serve--an important distinction then, with significant implications for future security assistance efforts. The venerable DC-3, also called the C-47 "Gooney Bird," was initially used for airlift and transport. Later, it was modified to assume innovative roles in fire support and intelligence collection. T-28s and modified B-26s were assigned to handle fire support and aerial reconnaissance. Each type of

aircraft was chosen because it could be maintained in an austere environment; was rugged enough to operate from unimproved, short airstrips; was within the technological reach of developing air forces; and was currently in the inventories of most countries likely to experience an insurgency.²⁶

Four months after activation, the 4400 CCTS sponsored its first overseas training deployment--parachute training from C-47s in Mali. In November, the second training detachment was deployed. This unit, code named "Farm Gate," was sent to Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese aircrews fighting Viet Cong insurgents. Jungle Jim and Farm Gate "would shape the role of the Air Force in small wars for years to come."²⁷ Future training detachments from the 4400 CCTS and its successor would continue to operate throughout Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia until the mid 1970s.

In 1962, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, created the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC). The SAWC was the Air Force's response to Secretary of Defense McNamara's call to do more in counterinsurgency.²⁸ The SAWC absorbed the men and equipment of the 4400 CCTS. Most importantly, though, the Center changed the the 4400 CCTS's mission from developing a unilateral capability to assisting others developing an indigenous capability to conduct COIN aerial operations. Responsibility for this COIN training fell to the Center's 1st Air Commando Group.²⁹ The bulk

of the Air Commando Group's effort was devoted to assisting the South Vietnamese, because the conflict was considered critical to US interests in Southeast Asia and because the Air Force leadership saw the war as an operational testing ground for counterinsurgency tactics and equipment.

As the war in Vietnam continued, however, the Air Commandos' mission slowly shifted away from providing advisory and combat ready forces to train indigenous forces. The requirement for air strikes and airlift to support the growing numbers of US ground units serving in Vietnam forced the Air Commandos to do less training and fly more combat missions.³⁰ The SAWC's mission gradually changed to training US aircrews for service in Southeast Asia. This continued until the war began to wind down. As the US began to reduce its commitments in Vietnam, the number of people and aircraft assigned to the wing declined. By 1974, with the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia completed, the Special Air Warfare Center (since renamed the Special Operations Force) was deactivated.³¹

The last few years of the Vietnam War had shaped American attitudes towards military intervention in foreign conflict. The mood of the American public was to avoid "unwinnable wars" in developing nations.³² Reflecting that attitude, President Nixon's 1969 State of the Union Address stated his criteria for applying US military power abroad. Over the next few years, Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Dr Henry Kissinger, promoted the idea that

the US would not fight on foreign soil unless our strategic interests were directly threatened. He further stated that this country would maintain its nuclear umbrella and that the United States would provide equipment, training and monetary assistance to its security partners.³³

President Nixon and Dr Kissinger recognized that the world was changing from the familiar USA-USSR bipolarity of the previous 25 years. They sought a new leadership role for the United States. What became known as the Nixon Doctrine said that the US must maintain a major role in the conduct of world affairs, but that the US could not be solely responsible for the maintenance of world harmony. Nixon's emphasis on security assistance and indirect military support has been continued by every US President.

After the Vietnam War, the Air Force retreated from the limited/unconventional/insurgent war it had fought in Southeast Asia. Instead, the Air Force concentrated on developing the high technology weapon systems necessary for those scenarios most critical to national survival--nuclear deterrence and conventional war in Europe, Korea, or Southwest Asia. Like the other Services, the Air Force focused on the conventional war and avoided insurgent warfare. One very senior Air Force general officer probably summed up the prevailing attitude best when he said that we "should not be distracted by 'those kind of wars' since we can always just 'muddle through.'"³⁴ This reliance on "somehow muddling through" leads to poor preparation for the

realities of future conflict. The history of modern warfare has shown the fallacy of this approach.³⁵ Since Vietnam, the highest priority for the Air Force has been to close the gap with the Soviet Union in strategic and high technology conventional systems.³⁶ That was accomplished at the expense of those doctrines, tactics, and systems applicable to aerial operations in counterinsurgency.

Although special operations forces have traditionally been responsible for FID, Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) have focused exclusively on direct action, and supporting unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance.³⁷ In 1984, Colonel Kenneth Alnwick pointed out that there had been a "major shift in emphasis, . . . moving the Air Force SOF community away from the traditional SOF missions in counterinsurgency, nation-building, and psychological warfare toward special operations behind enemy lines--more reminiscent of the World War II experience than the experience of the last two decades."³⁸

By optimizing its doctrine, training, and equipment for operations at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, the Air Force of the 1990s has effectively excluded itself from assisting those allies facing insurgents employing guerrilla tactics. Its structure cannot to adapt to the demands of conflict in and between developing nations. It appears as if the Air Force has taken a giant step backwards to the early 1960s. The present capability lacks tactical

flexibility--the same dilemma which frustrated President Kennedy. By focusing so exclusively on the Soviet Union, the conventional forces of the USAF today are analogous to those of 1960.

Just as their conventional counterparts, Air Force Special Operations Forces have built themselves into a potent, capable, technologically sophisticated force. They also, have focused their efforts on unilateral actions against developed nations. The time has come, however, to adjust that orientation. USAF Special Operations Forces should build and manage the capability to assist, train, and advise friendly foreign air forces. Then, like the Army Special Forces, they, too, might influence those "little wars . . . critical to Western security."³⁹

THE INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

There clearly is a war going on . . . a highly politicized form of warfare. It is political, psychological, economic and it's military, and frankly, we the United States institutionally do not understand it and are not organized to very effectively cope with it.

General Wallace Nutting⁴⁰

An insurgency is rooted in popular dissatisfaction with the existing social, political, and economic conditions. It is "an armed revolution against the established political order."⁴¹ The insurgent leadership may attempt to blame these conditions on the government in being and perhaps offer alternative programs to improve the situation.⁴² All societies have their problems, thus insurgent movements can usually find reason to oppose their governments. Creation of an effective, armed insurgent organization changes benign, constructive opposition into a revolutionary insurgency.⁴³

The mass-oriented insurgency, as designed by Mao Zedong, is difficult to organize. Once begun though, it enjoys a high probability of success and will most likely require external assistance to defeat. It is therefore, the type of conflict US forces will most likely face.⁴⁴

Maoist revolutionary warfare encompasses three phases, ranging from initial political organization in Phase One to mobile, conventional warfare in Phase Three.⁴⁵ Not all

revolutions experience each phase to the same degree or in the same manner, but this is an accepted model and a good starting point for discussion of revolutionary warfare.




Figure 1.

Mao's goal was to turn Western military thought and attitudes against his opponents, denying them quick victory and exhausting them militarily and politically. Each of his three phases overlap and the revolution proceeds to the next phase or reverts to a previous one as circumstances dictate. As the model (Fig 1) illustrates, each phase forms the foundation for the next; thus, activities of previous phases are always present when the insurgency advances another step.

During Phase One, "Latent and Incipient Insurgency," the insurgency is still germinating and is relatively weak.⁴⁶ Phase One of revolutionary warfare involves no major outbreaks of violence because the guerrillas are too weak to conduct offensive combat operations. General Galvin noted that it usually takes about 15 years to develop the

infrastructure before insurgents can move into Phase Two, Guerrilla Warfare.⁴⁷ The government must regain and/or hold the support of the people in contested or guerrilla-controlled areas. The military's role is to assist the government's development programs and to provide security for the people and government agencies operating in the contested areas.

The ultimate goal is to defuse or defeat the insurgency during Phase One. In order to keep an insurgency at this level, aggressive government social, economic, educational and political programs must address the root causes of the dissatisfaction. While development programs cannot guarantee that the government will remain in power, they do help build a support base among the population from which to resist the insurgents' appeal. The need for nonmilitary reforms nearly always outweighs any possible benefits to be gained by military action alone. To help initiate reforms, military and police forces must first guarantee the security of the people. In addition, they must complement and support the government's programs to develop the economy, improve the standard of living, and provide necessary health and welfare services to the populace. Security forces create the stable environment necessary for government sponsored reforms to take root and have an effect.⁴⁸

The role of US military forces is to enable and enhance the government's efforts to win back the support of the people. The US Air Force must understand and embrace its

supporting role in the IDAD plan and imbue that spirit into the host nation's air force. The methods employed by USAF forces include security assistance training programs to bolster military and police forces, as well as humanitarian and civic action programs such as medical and veterinary services, construction projects, or logistics management. Flying training programs should emphasize support of development programs and providing mobility to military and police forces responding to acts of terrorism--an emphasis on support instead of tactical combat operations.

During this phase, when cultivating and maintaining the support of the people, it is especially important to avoid the collateral damage often coincident with aerial fire support. USAF training teams should promote alternatives to strike operations and bolster reconnaissance and airlift capabilities in the supported nation.

Phase Two, "Guerrilla warfare," is reached when the insurgents begin organized guerrilla warfare and related violence.⁴⁹ It can happen only after the insurgents believe they have gained enough local and external support to conduct sustained combat operations. By denying the government access to certain areas of the country, forcing government agents and troops into static, defensive positions, or causing the government to institute harsh and repressive policies, the insurgents alienate the government from the people. The insurgents, in effect, negate the legitimacy of the government to govern.

Successful tactical operations, when properly conducted by government forces, can reduce the guerrilla threat, show government strength and resolve, and allow the agencies involved in the counterinsurgency to continue their development programs free from harassment. As in Phase One, if internal development programs are given the chance to work, the root causes of the dissatisfaction which spawned the insurgency are more likely to be resolved. This in turn deprives the insurgents of the popular support they need to survive and contributes to defeating the insurgents with minimal combat action.⁵⁰

If the insurgents escalate to organized guerrilla warfare, the need for government-sponsored development programs remains and the need for security is compounded. The nature of guerrilla warfare allows the insurgents to hold the initiative and thus dictate the course and tempo of the struggle. The government's goal, therefore, is to wrest that advantage from the insurgents and regain control of the conflict. The need for timely and accurate intelligence increases tremendously at this point. Accurate, timely intelligence enables the government to reverse the insurgents' advantage. A primary task of USAF FID teams would be to train host nation air forces to collect, analyze, and exploit aerial intelligence.

As numerous historical examples show, an equally important mission for air and aviation forces during counterinsurgency operations is to provide mobility to ground

forces. Because infantrymen are usually better suited to finding and destroying the insurgent guerrillas than aircraft, the government can increase the capability of its ground forces through effective use of air mobility. It is a fact that security forces cannot be everywhere at once. Superior mobility enables them to counter the insurgents' initiative. US Air Force training tasks during Phase Two will be very similar to those found in Phase One, namely air mobility, intelligence, support of government development programs, and limited fire support.

As the insurgents mount organized guerrilla actions, they are vulnerable to alert government forces attempting to neutralize them. Unlike the single terrorist, a guerrilla organization can be defeated by means familiar to most military professionals. Even more so than in Phase One, the major contributions of aerial forces would be intelligence and mobility. As the British and the French learned in Malaya, Indochina, and Algeria, counterinsurgency warfare is a matter of "identification, isolation, and annihilation of the enemy."⁵¹

During Phase Three, "War of Movement," the insurgents are able to directly engage the government in open, conventional conflict. An example of Phase Three is the 1968 Tet Offensive, when Vietnamese forces transitioned from guerrilla operations to conventional warfare. During this phase, armored forces are used to fight conventional warfare. If US combat forces are required to intervene at this point,

it is likely because all other efforts have failed. The object of US security assistance is to defeat an insurgency while it is in Phase One, but certainly before it matures in Phase Two. All US military development and defense efforts should focus on effective assistance, in accordance with the imperatives of low intensity conflict. In this way, we should be able to avoid Phase Three and the introduction of US combat units.

The experience of the United States in these sort of conflicts has been less than gratifying. The United States has been involved in many such wars "on the periphery" with limited success since 1945. When these conflicts were not central to US vital interests, we entered them with vague objectives and partial commitment. As the US experience in Vietnam showed, committed opponents could persevere until the American people tired of the effort. The paradox remains, however, that if the US is to be effective in protecting its interests, it must be capable of fighting or supporting limited wars against adversaries fighting unlimited wars.⁵²

Furthermore, in a world of increasing interdependence and changing superpower relationships, regional powers have emerged that dilute the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. This relative decline in the national power of the two superpowers tends to encourage lesser powers to pursue regional interests and further contributes to worldwide instability. Their independent actions often sponsor or sustain dissent by minorities in

other countries seeking to change the status quo. As the interests of regional powers, the Soviet Union, and the United States collide within the Third World, the US can "expect to be involved in LIC and operations to prevent LIC for the foreseeable future."⁵³

ANALYSIS

In the colonial wars after World War II . . . , air power functioned almost entirely in a supporting mode. The few analysts . . . generally concluded that air power's most effective use was in its non-firepower role--reconnaissance, transport, liaison, and in general providing increased mobility for other arms.

Dr David MacIsaac⁵⁴

Any actions taken by the United States in a revolutionary insurgent situation must meet the imperatives of low intensity conflict: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, and restricted use of force.

"Success in the [COIN] environment requires planning and conducting operations based on [the above] imperatives."⁵⁵

These principles help ensure that military efforts are channeled towards success and that the military assumes the proper role in a security assistance operation.

The methods employed by USAF forces assisting in a counterinsurgency would normally be geared to developing the host nation's aviation capability. Meeting this criterion requires flexible and tailorable forces. Adaptable forces must be capable of integrating their efforts into the programs of other US agencies operating in the target nation or region. The USAF team assisting a nation should be capable of responding to the peculiar needs and priorities of the host country.

The challenge for USAF teams assisting friendly developing nations is the technology and resource gap. Typically, the host nation has a shortage of aviation assets--sometimes the entire air force may consist of a few dozen aircraft of varying types and vintages. Typically, the aircraft are older and logistically difficult to support. Too often, newer aircraft, though inherently more capable are beyond the ability of the recipients to operate, maintain, and employ. Lastly, in too many nations likely to need US security assistance, scarce resources and US monetary assistance would be best applied to nonmilitary solutions. There is an obligation to ensure that development, as well as defense, receives adequate attention.

An important consideration when tailoring Air Force detachments to conduct Foreign Internal Defense is that they provide the most effective aviation equipment items and services to meet both defense and development needs. Emphasis of the detachment's efforts, therefore, should be on minimizing costs and preventing host nation reliance or dependence on US support. "Military doctrine and force structure advice must be adapted to the host country's circumstances and not based solely on a US model."⁵⁶ USAF assistance should include advising them as to the best way to employ their indigenous weapon systems to support government programs.⁵⁷ Furthermore, USAF advisors and trainers should facilitate the creation of mechanisms to link host government civic action, internal development, and humanitarian

assistance programs with the security mission and defense capabilities of the indigenous weapon systems.

In order to meet the security assistance requirements of friendly foreign governments, the USAF training detachments should be capable of teaching basic flying skills to host nation aircrews, advising them on the proper employment of aircraft in a counterinsurgency environment and teaching COIN tactics to host nation pilots. While there are many more combat, support, and technical skills that USAF personnel could offer to the host government, these are the most common application of Air Force flying capabilities to COIN warfare.

As the successful employment of air power in Malaya and Algeria demonstrated, the two classic roles of air power in counterinsurgency were "gathering intelligence and providing mobility."⁵⁰ Fire support was also a primary function, but the threat of firepower was often more potent than its actual application. Although the principals of counterinsurgency aerial warfare are intended for host nation forces, they apply equally to USAF forces engaged in security assistance. It is the task of USAF FID teams to advise, train and encourage host governments to effectively apply their limited resources to best meet the needs of that nation.

Because FID emphasizes the supporting role of the military and the need to restore social and economic welfare, the preference should be on multifunctional, simple, rugged, inexpensive aircraft. In addition, the missions look more like tactical airlift, reconnaissance, and fire support than

special operations against conventional opponents. The aircraft, if any, needed by developing nations must also support the host nation's internal development plan. First and foremost, they must be inexpensive enough to buy a reasonable number while not bankrupting what is probably already a troubled economy. Secondly, the aircraft should be simple to operate and maintain, given the typically limited educational and technical base in most developing nations. Lastly, they must be rugged enough to operate from small, austere airstrips in countries usually lacking a developed infrastructure.

An important caution should be interjected at this point. While fire support is an important and viable mission for aerial forces conducting counterinsurgency operations, it is prudent to apply aerial firepower sparingly and judiciously. Generally, important political, economic, and sociological considerations restrict the use of firepower.⁵⁹

A key policy of counterinsurgency is the minimal use of firepower in order to limit collateral damage. Collateral damage feeds the insurgent's propaganda machinery, possibly negating the gains made with government-sponsored development programs. Fire support is definitely a "two edged sword." While it can disrupt and destroy insurgent forces, small mistakes in targeting can potentially cause more problems than any advantage it accrues.

The limited funds and resources usually available to nations experiencing an insurgency ought to be channeled to correcting the internal problems that spawned the conflict. It is a mistake to divert precious resources towards multimillion-dollar F-16s, for example, when the money might be better spent on schools, health care, or roads. More importantly, one has to question if the country has the technical and educational base to support such high technology aircraft. USAF trainers and advisors have a responsibility to offer effective help once a nation asks for our assistance. That obligation includes advocating the proper aircraft, if any, for the unique situation facing the host government. Developing nations tell us they require simple, inexpensive, easily operated and maintained systems.⁶⁰ Security assistance teams must encourage them to forego the prestige factor of a modern frontline fighter in order to resolve the internal problems and restore the stability of their nation.

During the 1960s, the US Air Force had the capability to adapt its training and assistance programs to address the specific needs of the country it was helping. These training detachments were organized, trained and equipped to "help Third World air forces grow effectively."⁶¹ Since then, the focus on security assistance seems to have been on forming other air forces in the USAF's image. The forces traditionally charged with conducting foreign internal defense, the Air Force Special Operations Force, are for the

most part limited to one-time, direct action missions. The ability to assist Third World air forces with COIN on a long-term basis is not within the means of any current USAF forces, special or conventional.⁶²

An Air Force FID organization for the 1990s must have a worldwide focus and capability. The unit would be expected to support security assistance detachments in Africa, South America, and Asia simultaneously. To best meet the needs of all the different host countries, these teams will have to be tailored for each situation. According to the Army and Air Force manual for foreign internal defense, this translates into regional expertise and an organizational structure flexible enough to adapt to the various conditions found in the many possible supported nations.⁶³

In order to meet the myriad commitments, one would expect the FID unit to build small teams or detachments of instructors, culturally attuned and reasonably fluent in the appropriate languages. In addition, the unit must be sufficiently resourced, both in aircraft and personnel, to sustain a reasonable number of deployed training detachments throughout the world and their long-term commitment to those supported countries. This requirement to support a number of detachments simultaneously, for extended periods of time, will probably require a fairly large and complex organization. The specific details and structure of the

detachments, though, would have to be determined through a thorough mission area analysis. Anything more than conjecture is outside the purview of this paper.

As Colonel Dean stated, the Air Force role in counter-insurgency must be considered in terms of assistance, integration of forces, and possible intervention. Only after careful analysis, can one determine the proper response to requests for USAF assistance. The structure and functions of training teams sent to advise and train host nations would then fall out. Although many similarities would exist between detachments, each response to Third World assistance would be different. The nature of the insurgency, the economic and social conditions of the country, and the number and types of aircraft available to the host nation's air forces are a few of the factors to consider when tailoring a training package. The priority of the detachment's effort should go to building an effective, responsive air capability, yet ensuring that the host nation does not become dependent on the United States for material and services.

CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION

In order to restore the capability to train others to conduct counterinsurgent aerial warfare, I propose dedicating an Air Force wing to foreign internal defense. To best provide indirect support to friendly foreign governments, the wing's structure should facilitate assistance and training of foreign air forces. Specifically, the wing must be capable of building specialized training detachments, tailored to meet the peculiar training, organization, and equipment needs of the country they are supporting. Members of the training detachments would likely require foreign language skills and detailed area orientation. The four primary missions for such a wing would be teaching basic flying skills to host nation aircrews, teaching proper counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics to host nation pilots and USAF cadre members, developing and testing new COIN aerial warfare tactics, and integrating weapon systems and mission areas for innovative, multifunctional employment.

Special Operations Forces in both the Army and the Air Force have traditionally conducted foreign internal defense. In fact, they are the only US military forces assigned the FID mission.⁶⁴ Therefore, this proposal presumes that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) would also assume

proponency for a FID Wing. The most recent version of JCS Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, says that certain Air Force SOF units may support FID.⁴⁵ Air Force Special Operations Wings are currently organized, trained, and equipped to support the theater commanders' war plans in a mid to high intensity scenario. While the MC-130 Combat Talon, AC-130 Spectre, and the MH-53 Pave Low are amazingly capable aircraft, there is little need for these high technology, special operations weapon systems in nearly all instances when the USAF is asked to provide advice or training.

The proposed FID Wing would be analogous to the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) of the 1960s. Like the SAWC, the wing's primary mission would be to train others in counter-insurgent aerial warfare. To support the mission and to sustain itself, the wing will have to train USAF cadre members to execute the tactics and methods unique to this form of combat and combat support. Also, the wing should be capable of developing, testing, and validating new tactics and innovative concepts for integrating weapon systems. Lastly, as the basis of knowledge grows after experiencing various training deployments, the wing might serve as a clearinghouse for innovative concepts of COIN aerial support.

Aircraft assigned to the FID Wing ought to be supportable by the Air Force logistics and personnel systems. Also, the aircraft should represent those technologies most often found in the developing nations the wing's training

detachments would likely support.** While the optimum solution would be to use aircraft currently in the inventory and crews already qualified to fly them, this may not be possible. The modern US Air Force does not use many of the smaller, less capable aircraft found in most developing nations. When forming the wing, the goal should be to minimize new aircraft procurement and avoid creating a logistics tail to support a new weapon system.

The Air Commandos of the 1960s were able to use vintage aircraft from the "boneyard" because they were still being used by many developing nations. Those aircraft met the standards of simplicity, ruggedness, and cost demanded by economies ill prepared to support new or complex systems. Regardless that there are few of these older aircraft available for export, this older technology is not suited to today's version of COIN. The good news, is that the commercial marketplace contains an array of aircraft often better suited to developing nations' needs.

Because many developing nations look to the United States for guidance, the FID Wing ought to be flying the types of aircraft it encourages others to buy. This restores a measure of credibility because we fly what we advocate and avoids the "prestige" factor in aircraft sales. While it may not be feasible to fly all the possible choices of aircraft, the wing could use aircraft in the same category and class. As the failure of the Northrop F-20 low cost, export fighter project during the Carter Administration clearly


demonstrates, Third World nations are reluctant to invest in an aircraft not "good enough" for the United States.

Although the F-20 was a significant upgrade of the F-5 fighters then being flown by many Third World air forces, none were sold because those countries didn't want what they perceived to be a second-rate jet.*7

The FID Wing's aircraft should consist of modern STOL (short takeoff and landing) airlifters, light utility helicopters, and light attack/trainers. By concentrating on three aircraft, the supportability of the wing remains manageable. As previously stated, the ideal aircraft flown by detachments from the FID Wing would be the same as those flown by the host country, but on the surface this seems too hard to do. Because the choices are endless and it isn't reasonable to expect the Wing to fly and maintain more than a few different aircraft, the assigned aircraft should be as similar in performance and capability as possible to those found in the supported nations.

Unlike the host nation, the FID Wing would probably be restricted to American-made products, although if the proposal were adopted, it would be worthwhile to seek an exemption to the "Buy American" statutes imposed by Congress. While the host nation would likely look for inexpensive, simple, rugged, and easily maintainable aircraft, the Wing's criteria would be slightly different. Like the countries its training detachments would support, the FID Wing should emphasize simplicity, reliability, and ruggedness. In

addition, its aircraft must possess some degree of self-deployability. The deployed training teams will be small, austere detachments with long, tenuous lines of support. To avoid diverting attention from their primary training mission, the teams' equipment should be reliable enough to avoid significant maintenance requirements while deployed and simple enough to be fixed in the austere conditions likely to be faced.



Proposed Wing Structure

Figure 2.

The proposed FID Wing (See Fig 2) has two flying squadrons, one technical training squadron, and the normal assortment of combat support squadrons associated with a combat aircrew training wing, i.e. maintenance,

transportation, communications, supply, services, and security police. Like the operations squadrons, the combat support squadrons could and should play a valuable role in the training of friendly foreign nationals. This is especially true in the areas of air base ground defense and air traffic control. The scope of this paper, though, limits discussion to just the operations squadrons. In order to support its advisory and training commitments around the world, the wing would command and control a number of mobile training detachments. These tailorable organizations should be task organized to meet the specific needs of their host government.

The Flying Training Squadron (FTS) ought to be responsible for all basic and advanced hands-on flying training, whether deployed with the training detachments or at home station. All cadre members should be rated instructors and mission (combat) ready in their previous weapon systems before they report to the FID wing. The FTS would consist of three flights, each based on one of the three assigned weapon systems: STOL airlifter, light attack aircraft, and utility helicopter. Each flight would train USAF instructor cadre in COIN aerial warfare, conduct basic flying and advanced tactical training for foreign crew members being trained at the Wing's home station, and provide qualified crew members to constitute the deployed training detachments.

A key obligation of the FID wing would be to develop innovative and imaginative uses for common aircraft. The Combat Development Squadron (CDS), as the second flying squadron, serves that function. In that role, it would be the integrating center for the wing. More importantly, the CDS should evaluate current tactics and develop new or refine the old tactics and procedures as required. The CDS would also be the proponent for developing and fielding organizations keyed to the specifics of a given counter-insurgency.

One key element of this process is designing innovative ways to integrate the different types of aircraft. Pilots and crewmembers assigned to the CDS would not normally perform the training and assistance functions. Their task would focus primarily on the development of new procedures and equipment, as well as innovative modifications to old weapon systems.

Rather than being organized around a specific weapon system, the Combat Development Squadron is a composite organization, internally grouped according to mission area. Specifically, there should be a mobility flight, a reconnaissance/psychological operations flight, and a fire support flight. In order to emphasize mission area orientation over specific aircraft capability, each flight ought to contain crewmembers from each of the various applicable weapon systems.

The mobility flight would be made up of USAF and US Army cadre members qualified in tactical airlift and helicopter assault. They would be responsible for innovative approaches for delivering or retrieving cargo and personnel in combat situations. Made up of a complete array of crew members, the flight would concentrate on air assault and airdrop operations. The missions would be similar to those of a tactical airlift squadron or an assault helicopter company. In addition, they would develop and refine helicopter insertion and extraction equipment and methods, and innovative landing zone location and marking aids. Lastly, the flight should look at ways of using attack aircraft to deliver cargo as well as fires.

The reconnaissance/psychological operations flight could possibly be the most important of the three. It is well documented that one of the government's primary needs during the early phases of an insurgency is for timely and accurate information. In addition, spreading the word has been proven to help the government's case with the people. All three types of aircraft can perform valuable functions in both mission areas. The helicopters and the attack aircraft are capable of scouting and locating targets visually. The airlifter and perhaps the helicopter, would be ideal platforms for radio direction finding and infrared detection equipment. A pod or strap-on system could enable the airlifter to serve dual cargo and reconnaissance roles. For loudspeaker operations, leaflet drops, and airborne radio

broadcasts, each aircraft has a possible role. The flight would look at the best ways of accomplishing these missions, and ways to improve methods and equipment.

The fire support flight would integrate the light attack aircraft, the assigned STOL airlifter, and helicopters as fire platforms. Aerial fire support is the tactical mission entailing the most risk for the government. The fire support flight's mission would include looking at ways of increasing accuracy to limit collateral damage, providing accurate night fire support in austere situations, and developing alternative munitions that might better serve the needs of a host nation's circumstances. Forward air control tactics and equipment should be another function of the flight.

The Technical Training Squadron (TTS) serves many of the same functions similar squadrons currently do in tactical and combat crew training wings. It should offer an array of classroom instruction geared to specific weapon systems and to the operating conditions peculiar to counterinsurgency, such as air navigation in austere or hostile environments. One of the most important missions of this squadron would be to provide initial and sustaining language training to US cadre assigned to the wing. All classroom instruction required prior to flying training and for support training offered by the wing would also be the responsibility of the TTS. In addition, the gamut of academics, such as area studies, COIN familiarization, and Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) planning, would be offered to members of the

wing, appropriate outside commanders and staff planners, and others needing a background in COIN. Lastly, it would be appropriate to include self-defense, area oriented survival (e.g. jungle, desert), languages, and cultural awareness training under the TTS umbrella.

Choosing an instructor cadre could be a formidable task. The function of the wing is outside the mainstream of the Air Force. Recruiting sufficient experienced instructors will be a challenge, especially at the start. The intent is to develop a cadre of instructors with credibility in the airlift, air assault, and fire support mission areas, rather than experience in all the possible aircraft the host nations might possess. This also means that the cadre will likely include US Army as well as US Air Force instructors. My proposition is that an experienced, tactically proficient US pilot can transition to aircraft similar to the ones flown by the FID Wing easier than he can learn to employ an aircraft tactically. His credibility stems from tactical expertise in the mission area rather than total number of hours in type. As an example, an Air Force A-10 pilot who flies an OV-10 in the FID Wing could possibly fly the Hawk (British), the Tucano (Brazilian), or the Pilatus (Swiss) with deployed FID teams. The goal is to develop an aviation instructor who can apply his previous background to the specific COIN environment of the supported country.

This notional wing structure takes advantage of equipment and skills currently available in the Air Force of

the 1990s. The US military and the US Air Force "must be prepared to help selected nations help themselves through such programs as security assistance."** Just as the structure of the 1960's Special Air Warfare Center was adaptable enough to accommodate the conditions found in each country requesting USAF support, so too, should the proposed FID wing be able to modify its structure. The requirement to concurrently support a number of tailored training detachments, culturally attuned and able to speak the appropriate languages, seems to indicate a larger than normal wing structure with specialized skills not typically found in the generic Air Force wing. The exact size and composition, though, would have to be determined by a detailed mission analysis, prior to creating the organization.

Because public opinion and national policy restricts the use of US military forces in foreign conflicts, especially revolutionary counterinsurgencies, their most likely role will be to train or advise friendly foreign governments. Since the deactivation of the Special Air Warfare Center in 1974, the ability to indirectly support counterinsurgencies has been sorely lacking in the USAF. There is an important, valid need for the Air Force to restore the training and advisory capability it lost in 1974. The proposed Foreign Internal Defense wing offers a way of regaining that capability. This proposal offers a way of restoring the Air Force unit structure dedicated and organized to perform the missions of foreign internal defense in developing nations.

¹John F. Kennedy, as quoted in David J. Dean, "The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center." Air University Review, January-February 1985, p 50.

²National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: The White House, January 1988), p 35.

³FM 90-8, Counter guerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: Hq Dept of the Army, 1986), p 3-1.

⁴Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984, pp 5-6. These preconditions include introducing forces to combat only as a last resort, with the sustained support of the American people, with clearly defined political and military goals, and with the clear commitment to win.

⁵AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Vol 1, (Draft) (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1990), p 4-3.

⁶Col Ray E. Stratton, ed. "US Air Force Special Operations Doctrine and Technology: Time for a Reappraisal," in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1986), p 358.

⁷Thomas J. Doherty, Airpower Journal, Summer 1990, p 3. This former squadron commander of the 1st Special Operations Squadron and special operations force structure developer at HQ USAF, affirms a common lament that "today's Air Force lacks the ability to train and educate our allies to employ (COIN weapons)."

⁸Jerome W. Klingaman, Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, AL. Conversation with Mr Klingaman, the Air University proponent for USAF Low-Intensity Conflict, 1 Nov 90.

⁹Lt Col David J. Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1986), p 78. Hereafter cited as The Air Force Role in LIC.

¹⁰Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 108.

¹¹JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test Pub) (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990), p I-18.

¹²JCS Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), p 150.

¹³Jerome W. Klingaman, "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1986), p 138.

¹⁴Paul F. Gorman, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola," paper presented to Air Power Symposium, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 11-13 March 1985, p 9. Also see, Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Myth of US Capability in Unconventional Conflicts," Military Review, September 1988, p 12.

¹⁵Deborah Gallagher Meyer, "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with General John R. Galvin," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1985, p 36.

¹⁶Fact Sheet, USSOCOM FID Working Group (MacDill AFB, FL: Hq US Special Operations Command, November 1990). These include nation-building tasks such as economic reforms and renewing social infrastructure (medical, dental, veterinary, education, sanitation, etc).

¹⁷Fact Sheet, USSOCOM FID Working Group.

¹⁸National Security Strategy, p 35.

¹⁹Cheney, p 6.

²⁰AFM 2-X, p 28. The manual goes on to say that "The ability to change tactics, techniques, and procedures, equipment, and even doctrine is critical."

²¹JCS Pub 3-07, p I-23. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Approved Final Draft) (Washington, DC: Hq Depts of the Army and the Air Force, 1989), p 1-9.

²²Stratton, p 359.

²³Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1981), p 63.

²⁴Charles H. Hildreth, USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961 - 1962 (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1974), p. 5.

²⁵Hildreth, p 19.

²⁶Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum," Air University Review, March-April 1984, p 26.

²⁷Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 89.

²⁸Dean, Air University Review, p 50.

²⁹History, USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), 1 April - 31 December 1962, p 2. The 1st Air Commandos proudly trace their heritage back to the Air Commandos who supported the Chindits and Merrill's Marauders in Burma during the Second World War.

³⁰Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 96. Although the training mission still existed on paper, it was all but ignored by TAC. In 1966, the mission of the SAWC was changed to place training third in priority, behind development of COIN doctrine and tactics, and the training of US forces for combat operations.

³¹Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 98.

³²Stratton, p 349.

³³Richard M. Nixon, "The Real Road to Peace," US News & World Report, Vol 72, No 26 (26 Jun 1972).

³⁴Col Dennis M. Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988), p 3.

³⁵Dr Robert M. Epstein, classroom discussion (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 27 November 1990).

³⁶Conclusion from panel discussion, "Employment: Joint Tactics and Techniques," The Role of Air Power in Low Intensity Conflict (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Power Symposium Record of Proceedings, March 1984), p 163.

³⁷JCS Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990), p II-3. The JCS Pub states that SOF perform five principal, interrelated missions: Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Counterterrorism, and Foreign Internal Defense.

³⁸Alnwick, p 18.

³⁹Neil C. Livingstone, "Fighting Terrorism and "Dirty Little Wars," Air University Review, March-April 1984, p 11.

⁴⁰Gen Wallace H. Nutting, "Nutting: Stand Fast," Newsweek, 6 Jun 83, p 24.

⁴¹Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, p 6. See also, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p 2-2, 2-3; and JCS Publication 3-07, p II-2, II-3.

⁴²JCS Publication 3-07, p II-2.

⁴³JCS Publication 3-07, p II-3.

⁴⁴FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p D-1.

⁴⁵Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), pp 20-22. Also, JCS Publication 3-07, p II-5.

⁴⁶FM 90-8, Counter guerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: Hq Dept of the Army, 1986), pp 1-3, 1-4.

⁴⁷Meyer, p 36.

⁴⁸AFM 2-X, p 28.

⁴⁹FM 90-8, p 1-4.

⁵⁰FM 90-8, p 3-2.

⁵¹Robert L. Hardie, "Airpower in Counterinsurgency Warfare," Professional Study No 3373 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1967), p 44.

⁵²Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, "Marlborough's Ghost: 18th Century Warfare in the Nuclear Age," Air University Review, July-August, p 37.

⁵³FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p 1-4.

⁵⁴Dr David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p 644.

⁵⁵JCS Pub 3-07, p I-22 and FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p 1-8.

⁵⁶JCS Pub 3-07, p I-20.

⁵⁷AFM 2-X, p 43.

⁵⁸Alnwick, p 25.

⁵⁹FM 90-8, p 5-1.

•°Maj Eric M. Pettersen, "Providing Tools for Victory in the Third World," Armed Forces Journal International (September 1988), p 108.

•¹Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 106.

•²Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 106.

•³FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p 1-9.

•⁴Fact Sheet, USSOCOM FID Working Group.

•⁵JCS Pub 3-05, p C-6.

•⁶JCS Pub 3-05, p C-6.

•⁷Dean, The Air Force Role in LIC, p 118.

•⁸JCS Publication 3-07, p I-13.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Air Power and Warfare, Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, 1978. Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, eds. (1979) Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC.
- Special Operations in US Strategy. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds. (1984). National Defense University Press, Washington, DC.
- Proceedings of the Air Power Symposium on the Role of Air Power in Low Intensity Conflict. (1985). Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- Dean, David J. (1986). The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- Drew, Dennis M. (1988). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- Futrell, Robert F. (1981). The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Year to 1965. Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC.
- Klingaman, Jerome W. (1986). Policy and Strategy Foundations for Low-Intensity Warfare. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- _____. (1986). "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars" in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology. David J. Dean, ed. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- MacIsaac, David. (1986). "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists." in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machivelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Samuel B. Griffith, ed. and trans. (1961). Praeger Publishers, New York, NY.
- Mrozek, Donald J. (1988). Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: Ideas and Actions. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Schultz, Dr Richard H., Jr. (1986). "Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy: Regional Threats, Soviet Involvement, and the American Response" in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology. David J. Dean, ed. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Schlight, John. (1988). The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in South Vietnam, The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968. Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC.

Stratton, Col Ray E. et al. (1986). "US Air Force Special Operations Doctrine and Technology: Time for a Reappraisal" in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology. David J. Dean, ed. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

National Security Strategy of the United States. (1990). The White House, Washington, DC.

National Security Strategy of the United States. (1988). The White House, Washington, DC.

JCS Publication 1-02. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (1988). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

JCS Publication 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Final Draft). (1990). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

JCS Publication 3-07. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test Pub). (1990). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. (1984). Hq Dept of the Air Force, Washington, DC.

AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 2 Volumes, (Draft). (1990). Hq Dept of the Air Force, Washington, DC.

AFM 2-10. Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Special Operations (Draft). (1990). Hq Dept of the Air Force, Washington, DC.

AFM 2-X. Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense Operations (Working Draft). (1990). Hq Dept of the Air Force, Washington, DC.

FM 90-8. Counter guerrilla Operations. (1986). Hq Dept of the Army, Washington, DC.

FM 90-25/MACP 55-35. Airlift for Combat Operations. (1990). Hq US Army Training and Doctrine Command and Hq Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, IL.

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20. Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict (Approved Final Draft). (1989). Hq Depts of the Army and the Air Force, Washington, DC.

FM 100-20-2. The Threat in Low Intensity Conflict (Coordinating Draft). (1990). US Army Combined Arms Center Threats Directorate, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

History, USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC). (1 Apr-31 Dec 1962).

PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES

Alnwick, Kenneth J. (Mar-Apr 1984). "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum." Air University Review, Vol 35, No 3.

Cheney, Dick. (Nov-Dec 1989). "DOD and Its Role in the War Against Drugs." Defense '89.

Dean, David J. (Jan-Feb 1985). "The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center." Air University Review, Vol 36, No 2.

Lindsay, James J. (May-Jun 1990). "Low-Intensity Conflict: Risks Increase." Defense 90.

Livingstone, Neil C. (Mar-Apr 1984). "Fighting Terrorism and Dirty Little Wars." Air University Review, Vol 35, No 3.

Meyer, Deborah Gallagher. (Dec 1985). "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with General John R. Galvin." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol 123, No 5.

Newton, Richard D. (Fall 1989). "A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support." Airpower Journal, Vol 3, No 3.

Nixon, Richard M. (25 Jun 72). "The Real Road to Peace." US News & World Report, Vol 72, No 25.

Nutting, Wallace H. (6 Jun 83). "Nutting: Stand Fast." Newsweek.

Olson, William J. (Feb 1989). "Low-Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge." Military Review, Vol 69, no 2.

Pettersen, Eric M. (Sep 1988). "Providing the Tools for Victory in the Third World." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol 126, No 2.

Schlachter, David C. (Jul-Aug 1984). "Another Perspective on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum." Air University Review, Vol 35, No 5.

Zais, Mitchell M. (Aug 1986). "LIC: Matching Missions and Forces." Military Review, Vol 66, No 8.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

"Can the USAF's Security Assistance System Provide Third World Client's Needs?" (1987). Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

"Considerations for Nation Building in Counterinsurgency Warfighting." (1989). Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

"Yesterday's Doctrine for Today's Contingencies: The Small Wars Manual and the Security Assistance Force in Low Intensity Conflict." (1988). School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Cartwright, Thomas F. (1972). "USAF Response to Insurgency in Developing Countries during the 1973-1983 Time Period." Air Command & Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Diddle, James A. (1971). "Counterinsurgency--A New Look?" Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Hardie, Robert L. (1967). "Airpower in Counterinsurgency Warfare." Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Hildreth, Charles H. (1964). "USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines & Capabilities, 1961-1964." Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

_____. (1964). "USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines, 1963." Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Patterson, Robert E., Jr. (1973). "The USAF Special Operations Force: Participation to Partnership." Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.